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INTRODUCTION
The improper appearance created by money in judicial elections is

one of the most important issues facing ourjudicial system today ....
A line needs to be drawn somewhere to prevent a judgefrom hearing
cases involving a person who has made massive campaign
contributions to benefit the judge. We certainly believe that, in this
case, acting ChiefJustice Benjamin crossed that line. - Theodore B.
Olson.'

This symposium article asserts that Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co.2 is correct in result; correct in its narrowness; and correct in calling
on courts to be more rigorous in recusal than due process requires. The
article argues that Caperton is a model of judicial restraint and that,
paradoxically for a decision overturning a state justice's non-recusal,
the majority's approach is a model of cooperative federalism. These
characteristics are particularly exemplified by the degree to which the
opinion tracks the counsel offered by the Conference of Chief Justices,
both as to what the opinion decides, and as to what it does not decide.
Second, the article asserts that the breadth of support for the petitioners
in Caperton, combined with state-level developments in the decision's
aftermath, support the proposition that the decision's greatest impact
will be not as dispositive precedent in itself, but in spurring greater
t Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School; J.D., Columbia Law School, 2003. From
2005 to June 2009, Professor Sample was counsel at the Brennan Center at NYU School of
Law, where he co-authored multiple reports on judicial elections and recusal, and served as
counsel on certiorari and merits stage amicus briefs in support of the petitioners in Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
1. Paul J. Nyden, Mining Appeal Moving Along, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 16,
2008, at IA (announcing Mr. Olson's representation of Harman Mining Company and its
president, Hugh M. Caperton, in its petition for a writ of certiorari based on Justice
Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself from Capertonv. A. T. Massey Coal Co.).
2. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252.
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vigilance in recusal, both systemically and among individual jurists.
I. CAPERTON: CORRECT TODAY

Ted Olson's framing of the issue in Caperton was masterful, and,
as the above quotation reflects, smartly limited in scope. The victory
Olson earned is appropriately narrow and yet, simultaneously,
significant for both client and cause. First, the decision ameliorates the
wrong inflicted on Harman Mining Company and its owner, Hugh M.
Caperton. The myriad extreme facts in the case presented the Court
with a landmark question of constitutional law. 3 But it was an easy state
question that gave birth to the difficult federal issue. West Virginia's
Code of Judicial Conduct required Justice Benjamin's disqualification
whenever his impartiality "might reasonably be questioned."4 Under
the code, Justice Benjamin's responsibility to disqualify was not a close
call. Applying the facts to the terms of the state rule, "might" it have
been "reasonable" to question Benjamin's impartiality? To answer that
question in the negative not only strains credibility, but also renders the
provision a nullity.
For those who argue that disqualification ought to be handled
exclusively at the state level-that is, those who effectively argue that
there is absolutely no constitutional floor regardless of whether the
expenditures total $3 million or $30 million-it is important to
acknowledge that if Benjamin had complied with the state rule, or if the
state had otherwise ensured Benjamin's disqualification, there would
have been absolutely no constitutional case. Yet the failure at the state
level was so glaring that twenty-seven former state supreme court
justices from around the country-hardly a group inclined to comment
on close calls involving matters of their fellow jurists' ethics-filed an
amicus brief stating unequivocally that, even apart from the

3. Respondents attempted to make much of the fact that Benjamin had voted against
Massey-a frequent litigant in the West Virginia courts in close and clear cases alike - in
other matters, including in cases with greater financial stakes. Brief for Respondents at 5051, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165. Critics who have since
repeated this argument are being careless at best. As petitioners noted in their reply,
"neither Massey nor Justice Benjamin identifie[d] a single case ... where Justice Benjamin
has cast an outcome-determinative vote against Massey." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10,
Caperton, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 476570.
4. See W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (2009) (requiring a judge to
"disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."); see also James Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair
Courts: Setting Recusal Standards, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2008), available at
http://brennancenter.org/content/resource/faircourts-settingrecusal_standards/ (noting the
near universality of this standard in the states).
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constitutional issue, the justices "uniformly believe[d] that the
participation of Justice Benjamin created an appearance of impropriety.
All amici participating in this brief would have recused if they had
benefited from the level and proportion of independent expenditures by
the CEO of a party to a case pending before the court." 5 Conspicuously,

neither the dissenters nor other critics of federalizing the floor for
disqualification offer anything to remedy that extant state-level
shortcoming.
The dissents are efforts at misdirection, focusing on hypothetical
future questions not before the Court, 6 while conceding, in Justice

Scalia's words, that it is "[u]ndoubtedly" clear that "[i]n the best of all
possible worlds" judges should "sometimes recuse even where the clear
commands of... due process law do not require it."'7 The implication is
that while ethical rules and judicial prudence counseled Benjamin's

recusal, Benjamin's lack of compliance was simply Caperton's "tough
luck." It is an approach that responds to the absence of a bright-line

rule with a conception of a completely impotent constitution, incapable
of providing case-by-case remedial protection. To be sure, Chief
Justice Roberts's questions in dissent point to several prospective
challenges with which to grapple. But the questions, raised as a means
of excoriating the Court's majority, are addressed to the wrong
audience. 8 Chief Justice Roberts's questions will be addressed (if at all)9
most appropriately in the first instance by the state courts themselves.
This was a point made express in the most noteworthy brief in the case,

5. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of
Petitioners at 5, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45979.
6. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing forty
numbered questions that he characterizes as "only a few uncertainties that quickly come to
mind.").
7. Id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Legal ethics expert Keith Swisher recently wrote an excellent piece in which he
"respectfully dissent[ed] from the dissent" stating that "every question, save one or two, can
be answered (and the ones that cannot seem to reflect more poorly on the questioner's
drafting than the majority's analysis)." Posting of Keith Swisher to Judicial Ethics Forum,
Caperton: Answers to the Chief Justice's "Twenty Questions" Times Two,
http://judicialethicsforum.con/2009/06/15/caperton-answers-to-chief-justice-robertstwenty-questions-times-two (June 15, 2009, 8:50 EST). Swisher also noted that "an umpire
who merely calls balls and strikes should be less concerned with questions not before the
court, and indeed, [that] every case could spawn a multitude of forward-looking questions
not raised by the facts at hand." Id. Swisher's article goes on to propose answers to each of
the 40 questions, and should be considered a must-read for those interested in the case. Id.
9. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 10, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45973 [hereinafter CCJ
Brief].
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that of the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ). 10 The CCJ's unique
perspective was lost neither on Olson, nor on the Court majority-a fact
strikingly indicated by an astounding ten express mentions of the CCJ
brief at oral argument."' Crafted on behalf of the CCJ by former Texas
Chief Justice Tom Phillips, Georgetown Professor Roy Schotland, and
D.C. attorney George Patton, the brief said, in essence, four things: (1)
"the Constitution may require the disqualification of a judge in a
particular matter because of extraordinarily out-of-line campaign2
support from a source that has a substantial stake in the proceedings";'
(2) "[b]ecause the applicability of the Due Process Clause in the
campaign spending context depends on the particular facts of each case,
no bright-line rule can or should be attempted";' 3 (3) fears that a ruling
constitutionally
requiring
disqualification
would "open
the
floodgates"-such as those ultimately articulated by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia-were "unfounded";' 4 and (4) "due5 process
review... would be limited to cases of extraordinary support."'
The Chief Justice's failure to heed his state counterparts' counsel,
resulted in what one editorial called "the only truly alarming thing about
[the] decision"-the lack of unanimity despite Chief Justice Roberts's
fondness for "likening a judge's role to that of a baseball umpire,"
noting that "[i]t is hard to imagine that professional baseball or its fans
would trust the fairness of an umpire who accepted $3 million from one
of the teams."' 6 The majority, on the contrary, issued a restrained, factbound opinion. It set a floor without drawing unnecessary and
sweeping bright lines, and without answering questions not presentedi.e., the majority decided the case in exactly the manner suggested by
the state chief justices themselves. Accordingly, Caperton can be seen
as a model of cooperative federalism, and Olson, indisputably among
the nation's premier federalists, deserves credit for recognizing so early
on the case's potential to be just that.
II. CAPERTON'S IMPORT TOMORROW

Ameliorating a real-world wrong in a $50 million case is hardly
10. Id.
11. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, 17, 19, 23-24, 46, 53, Caperton, 129 S. Ct.
2252
(No.
08-22),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/08-22.pdf.
12. CCJ Brief, supra note 9, at 4.
13. Id. at 22.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id.
16. Editorial, Honest Justice,N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A26.
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trivial, yet the case's potentially lasting influence is reflected in Olson's
quotation above: Caperton establishes, for the first time, against a
national backdrop of recent, exponential increases in judicial campaign
spending, an outer boundary of constitutional magnitude.' 7 While the
decision, like the petitioners' position before the Court, was mostly
though not unanimously cheered across the legal, judicial, and media
spectrum, 18 a few observers perceive it to be a kind of one-trip-only
case.' 9 Whether or not that proves true over time, the Court's analytical

17. Nyden, supra note 1, at LA.
18. Caperton has been particularly well received among jurists. See John Schwartz,
Uncertainty in Law Circles Over New Rules for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A20
(citing Alabama Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb's view that Caperton is a "'good thing'
because it will push judges to be more careful"); Posting of Nathan Koppel to Wall Street
Journal Law Blog, Massey Coal Ruling Getting Thumbs Up in Judicial Circles,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/08/massey-coal-ruling-getting-thumbs-up-in-judicialcircles (June 8, 2009, 14:47 EST) (noting, among others, Indiana Justice Randall Shepard's
view that "it was wise of the majority to focus not just on the amount of a particular
contribution... but its size relative to the total amount of contributions"); see also Posting
of Tony Mauro to The BLT: The Blog of the Legal Times, Coping with Caperton,
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/coping-with-caperton-a-conversation-with-tomphillips.html (June 10, 2009, 16:21 EST) (quoting former Texas Chief Justice Tom
Phillips's view that "Caperton established a principle that is really important: There are
constitutional concerns with a judge sitting in judgment of a case where a party is a
significant donor."). Meanwhile, academics and media have largely echoed American
University's Amanda Frost's assessment of the opinion as "a victory for common sense and
fundamental fairness." Amanda Frost, Op-Ed., Only a Partial Win, NAT'L L.J., June 15,
2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431401637&Only_a partial win&s
lreturn=l; see, e.g., Editorial, Honest Justice, supra note 16 (describing the "right to a fair
hearing before an impartial judge" as "more secure" following the decision).
19. This critique has been credibly raised by, among others, Linda Greenhouse, for
whom I have enormous respect, but with whom I disagree on this score. Linda and I, along
with others including Rick Pildes, have engaged in something of a public dialogue on the
topic of her critique. See Posting of Linda Greenhouse to The Supreme Court Breakfast
Table, http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221229/ (June 24, 2009, 10:06 EST) (in
which Greenhouse laments the grant of certiorari because, in her view, the case always
"promised more than it could possibly deliver"). My response to Linda along with her
rejoinder
may
be
found
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/phillipsoncaperton/.
See Posting of James
Sample to
Brennan
Center
for
Justice
Blog, Phillips on Caperton,
http://www.brennancenter.orgblog/archives/phillipsoncaperton (June 25, 2009); see also
Posting of Rick Hasen to Election Law Blog, A ClearerRead of James Samples' Comments
on Greenhouse on Caperton, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013954.html (June 25,
2009, 10:30 EST) ("For what it's worth, I agree with James. I think Linda understates the
potential of the opinion to change the role of money in judicial elections."); Posting of Rick
Pildes to Balkinization, Caperton and Boundary-Enforcing Justices Part I: How Vague
Law Can Create Stable Outcomes, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-andboundary-enforcing.html (June 25, 2009, 14:15 EST) (asserting that in analyzing the
decision, Greenhouse and Chief Justice Roberts "fail to consider ... that the enforcement
might include other institutional actors not constrained in the same way the Court is.").
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approach makes clear that judicial campaign expenditures implicate, in
addition to the First Amendment, unique countervailing due process
interests-interests that the states must protect to a minimum degree,
and should protect to a greater degree. In ordinary, garden variety
conflicts, the hortatory "should" will almost certainly prove more
consequential than the mandatory "must." Regardless, it is now a
matter of settled law that due process interests warrant an accounting. It
is the boundary-enforcing aspect that makes Caperton, in the words of
Rick Pildes, a "pathbreaking" decision of "momentous" import "for the
future of judicial elections and disputes over judicial bias." Similarly,
Rick Hasen, one of the nation's leading election law experts, asserts that
"Caperton provides a backstop for the most egregious cases of large
campaign spending," particularly when other measures are "off the table
or severely limited."21
The magnitude of the broader national crisis in the courtsembodied at its extreme by Caperton-is perhaps best articulated by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who opened an April 2008 conference22by
stating bluntly: "We put cash in the courtrooms, and it's just wrong."
Trends indicate recent, game-changing increases in the amount of
that cash. In the four election cycles concluding in 2006, judicial
candidates raised $157 million, nearly double the amount raised in the
four election cycles preceding 1999.23 Another way to look at the
numbers is to compare the increases in partisan and nonpartisan state
supreme court elections respectively. As the graph below indicates, in
both instances candidate fundraising in the 2000s through the year 2008
alone, literally dwarfs the totals for the entirety of the 1990s.

20. Posting of Rick Pildes to Balkinization, Caperton and the Supreme Court's
Boundary Enforcing Role, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-and-supremecourts-boundary.html (June 8, 2009, 12:05 EST).
21. Posting of Rick Hasen to Election Law Blog, Initial Thoughts on Caperton v.
Massey:
First Meaningful Limits
on Excesses
of Judicial Elections,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013784.htm (June 8, 2009, 7:58 EST).
22. Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash 'in the
Courtroom', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22.
23. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
2006,
at
15,
available
at
http://www.gavelgrab.org/wp-

content/resources/NewPoliticsofludicialElections2006.pdf.
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When, as in Caperton, the principal sources of financial support
their
are central stakeholders or counsel in cases pending before
25
suffers.
justice
impartial
of
perception
the
beneficiary's courts,

24. The fundraising totals in the graph are based upon aggregated data from the
National Institute on Money in State Politics. The data is available at Nat'l Inst. On Money
in State Politics, http://www.followthemoney.org. For purposes of the figures illustrated
above, the partisan category includes: Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, North
Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. The nonpartisan
category includes Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. Ohio and
Michigan are categorized as partisan states, even though candidates are not identified by
party on the ballots. In both states, candidates are identified with parties during the
campaign season; in Michigan, parties nominate the candidates. Illinois justices are first
selected in partisan elections and thereafter stand in retention elections. In New Mexico,
justices are appointed but must run in a partisan election the first time they defend their
office; after that, all elections are retention contests. In Montana, justices run in
nonpartisan, contested elections; incumbents without an opponent run in retention elections.
North Carolina held partisan elections until the 2004 cycle, when public funding was
introduced and high court elections became nonpartisan. In Pennsylvania, candidates run
for a first full term in partisan elections and run in retention elections thereafter.
25. Indeed, polling done by USA Today for a front-page article on the Caperton case
yielded striking results: "89% of those surveyed believe the influence of campaign
contributions on judges' rulings is a problem" and "[m]ore than 90% of the 1,027 adults
surveyed said judges should be removed from a case if it involves an individual or group
that contributed to the judge's election campaign." Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case
with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at Al, available at
Other
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-courtN.htm.
national surveys have indicated that over seventy percent of Americans think campaign
contributions have at least some influence on judicial decisions. See GREENBERG QUINLAN
ROSNER RESEARCH INC. ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001),
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A cursory glance at scenarios from around the country reveals that,
while Caperton was exceptional, there is no shortage of less extreme
scenarios that nonetheless implicate basic fairness concerns:
Less than two months after being disciplined by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court for ruling, while a lower court judge, on eleven cases
involving a bank for which her husband served as a director, Justice
Annette Ziegler authored a 4-3 decision in favor of the position
advocated by a group that spent over $2 million supporting her 2007
election. 26
As with Blankenship's expenditures compared to
Benjamin's, that sum alone was more than the entire total of Ziegler's
own campaign's expenditures. 27 The group had "long considered the
case a top priority."
In a 2004 race for a seat on the Illinois Supreme Court, two candidates
raised more than $9.3 million combined, a figure that outpaced
candidates in 18 U.S. Senate races that year, and which was nearly
double the previous national record for a judicial election. 29 The
winner of the election, then-trial judge Lloyd Karmeier, reflected on
the six-figure checks that poured into both sides of the campaignincluding from competing sides in a then-pending appeal-saying:
"That's obscene for a judicial race...What does it gain the people?
How can people have faith in the system?" 30 Karmeier nonetheless
refused to recuse himself
from the pending appeal and then ruled in
3
favor of his supporters. 1
The perception that campaign
bench in pending or imminent
lawyers give even when their
Angeles Times study found

contributions buy influence on the
cases is so strong that litigants and
candidate cannot lose: A 2006 Los
that even Nevada judges running

available at http://www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/1412_JAS-ntlsurvey.pdf; JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN,

MARCH 2004 SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS:

AMERICANS

SPEAK OUT ON JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS 4 (2004), available at http://www.faircourts.org/files/zogbypollfactsheet.pdf;
JAMES L. GIBSON ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY ON THE LEGITIMACY

OF COURTS: A SURVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT, PENNSYLVANIA, 2007, at 5 (2009), available at

http://polisci.wustl.edu/media/download.php?page=faculty&paper=157 (finding that many
citizens believe contributions to judicial candidates imply a conflict of interest and
undermine perceptions of court legitimacy).
26. Patrick Marley & Stacy Forster, Ziegler, Big Lobby Think Alike, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL,

July

12,

2008,

at

A6,

available

at

http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/29473254.html.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
2004,
at
14-15,
32
(2005),
available
at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/dd00e9b682e3ca2fl 7_xdm6io68k.pdf.
30. Id. at 19.
31. See James Sample, The Campaign Trial, SLATE, Mar. 6, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2137529.
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unopposed collected hundreds of thousands of campaign dollars from
litigants and lawyers. 32 The study noted that the donations were
frequently via checks dated
33 "within days of when a judge took action
in the contributor's case."
The worsening of these trends prior to Caperton is at least partly
attributable to an unexpected source-judicial independence advocates
whose singular focus on appointments rather than elections may, in
certain instances, distract from more achievable fairness protections.
Judicial selection presents something of a familiarity divide. Even
in the most fiercely contested jurisdictions, dynamics associated with
sleepier periods in state judicial politics, such as low voter turnout,
persist. 34 One consequence of this divide is the further ossification of
Thus, while many reformers and
judicial selection practices.
commentators call for changes, including most frequently, for state
judiciaries to abandon the elective process, 35 that drumbeat, from the
32. Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They're Playing with a
Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at Al, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/08/nation/na-vegas8.
33. Id.
34. Wisconsin's 2008 contest for a seat on the state's high court provides one recent
exemplar. On the one hand the state witnessed a racially-charged, contentious, and highprofile contest that broke a state record for expenditures in a judicial campaign. The
Annenberg Foundation's popular website, Factcheck.org, described the contest as a
"Wisconsin throwdown." Viveca Novak, Winning Ugly in Wisconsin, FACTCHECK.ORG,
Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/winning uglyin wisconsin.html.
At the same time, however, voter turnout in the April 1, 2008 election was below 20
percent. See JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, FACT SHEET: WISCONSIN 2008 SUPREME COURT
CAMPAIGN, http://www2.justiceatstake.org/files/WI2008factsheet.pdf (noting that turnout

fell short of the State Board of Elections' predicted turnout of 20 percent). There is some
evidence that the more hotly contested the campaign, the greater the interest. Laurence
Baum and David Klein, for example, compared two supreme court elections in Ohio and
found that voter roll-off in the lower visibility contest was double that of the higher
visibility contest. See Laurence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High Visibility
Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES

OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 141-56 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). Relative to top-of-the-ticket
races, however, voter roll-off rates in judicial elections are indisputably, and perhaps
appropriately, significant. To consider just one recent high profile supreme court election as
an example, in 2008 Michigan's then-Chief Justice, Cliff Taylor, was defeated in one of the
nation's most contentious and controversial judicial elections. Nonetheless-indeed
perhaps appropriately-while over five million Michigan voters, cast ballots in the
Presidential race, 1.2 million of those voters chose not to vote in the contest for the Chief
Results,
Election
General
Michigan
2008
See
seat.
Justice's
http://miboecfr.nicusa.com/election/results/08GEN (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
35. David Pozen, for example writes, "Those who would have the judiciary be more
than just another majoritarian branch might do well to ...remind the public and each other
that there is no adequate remedy for this threat save to dismantle judicial elections." David
E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 330 (2008). It is worth
noting, however, that Pozen is also an advocate of strengthened recusal standards, having

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 60:293

public's perspective rarely, if ever, reaches levels of widespread
salience. In turn, and while only small percentages of citizens in states
with elective judiciaries actually vote in judicial races, inertia and/or
apathy generally stymies efforts aimed at taking away their right to do
so because fundamental changes to state judicial selection methods
often require popular approval by the voters.3 6 Consequentially,
repeated calls for fundamental changes prove to be of scant pragmatic
value. Moreover, appointment-system proponents may actually be
contributing to the degradation of judicial fairness via an excessive
emphasis on unrealistic, anti-populist changes rather than a focus on
achievable incremental measures.
The factual backdrop-rarely
mentioned in the rhetoric-reflects that the last state to move from a
system of judicial elections to merit selection was New Mexico, which
did so in 1988.37 Such a picture, when viewed in conjunction with the
dramatic worsening of trends in judicial elections, ought to occasion at
least a bit of discomfort among appointment advocates who see
themselves as agents not only of their preferred reform but more
fundamentally, of the values of due process and judicial independence.38
An early acknowledgment of this dynamic appeared in the "Call to
Action" coming out of a National Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection. The summit, which was comprised of a who's who of state
judges, court administrators, reform groups and scholars, offered a
multi-page proposal of selection reforms premised on the notions that
"movement away from systems providing for contested election of
co-authored multiple papers on the subject. See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David
E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46
WASHBURN L.J. 503, 504 (2007); James Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair
Courts: Setting Recusal Standards,supra note 4.
36. An interesting recent op-ed by the former Chief Justice of the Nevada Supreme
Court, Bob Rose, a proponent of a commission-based appointive process, criticizes the often
false populist outcry of "elitism" against merit-based appointment commissions. Bob Rose,
Nevada's Judicial Selection Commission Has a Proven Track Record, RENO GAZETrE-J.,
July 26 2009, availableat http://m.rgi.com/detail.jsp?key=226716&rc=op&full = 1.
37. New Mexico's system, for that matter, is hardly resounding in its rejection of the
democratic process, involving merit selection to fill all vacancies, followed by contestable
partisan elections, followed by retention elections. See Seth Andersen, Examining the
Decline in Support for Merit Selection in the States, 67 ALB. L. REv. 793, 793 (2004)
(noting that "[p]opular support for constitutional change from judicial elections to merit
selection systems has declined significantly over the past three decades.").
38. Questions as to the relative merits of elective and appointive systems are beyond
the scope of this article. Indeed, my personal agnosticism on that debate is born of
pragmatics, i.e., of the view that because of political realities, nuanced incremental
protections for judicial fairness-such as public financing and strengthened recusal
practices-are more likely to produce real-world results than additional categorical
indictments of (depending on the source) elective or appointive systems.
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judges has not occurred" and that "[t]oo little attention has been given
to address some
to incremental changes in the judicial election process
39
of the most serious threats to judicial independence."
The broad amicus support for the petitioners in Capertonincluding CCJ's strong support for the petitioners' legal arguments-is
not only a tangible product of that call to action, but also represents a
further softening in the appointments-or-bust mentality of some judicial
reformers. Amici spanning the spectrums of political right and political
left; of trial attorneys and business giants like Intel, Wal-Mart, Pepsico,
Lockheed Martin; of former jurists and the American Judicature Society
along with bar organizations including the ABA; and from both sides of
the binary elections versus appointments debate, coalesced around the
core principle that, while opinions differ as to optimal selection
methods, the judiciary, regardless of how selected, must respect-and
protect-core minimum fairness values. 40 The breadth of support for
petitioners, combined with all nine of the justices acknowledging (in
their respective opinions) the uncontroversial purview of the states to
enact "more rigorous" recusal measures than due process requires,
provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts. 41
Noting the split between overzealous advocates who see Caperton
as the final nail in the coffin for judicial elections, and those, who like
Chief Justice Roberts, see it as opening the recusal floodgates, Eliza
Newlin Carney writes that "both scenarios miss the mark. The ruling's
more likely outcome is that state supreme courts will establish and
enforce clearer recusal rules for judges who may face conflicts of
interest, guidelines that are long overdue." 42 Strengthened recusal
39. Symposium, Call to Action: Statement of the National Summit on Improving
JudicialSelection, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1353, 1354 (2001); see also Charles Gardner Geyh,
The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21
GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1279 (2008) (noting that changing election systems "can be a

worthy goal and one well worth pursuing... , but not at the expense of ignoring shorterterm remedies that can make a bad system better in the interim."). In many respects, the
American Judicature Society, which staunchly and unapologetically promotes merit
selection, but which has also proven to be a reliable supporter of interim efforts to protect
judicial independence in elective systems-such as their support for petitioners in
Caperton-isa model of the triage advocated by Professor Geyh.
40. A complete list of amici in the case, along with highlighted excerpts from their
found
at
may
be
legal
arguments,
respective
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/caperton-v massey/.
41.

See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) ("States may

choose to 'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires."' (quoting
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).

"States are, of course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution requires." Id.
at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
42. Eliza Newlin Camey, A Win for Fairer Courts, NAT'L J. ONLINE, June 15, 2009,
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practice is not a panacea for the courts, but it is an important step.
Indeed, since Caperton, California, Nevada, Wisconsin, Michigan, West
Virginia, Ohio, and Washington have begun or continued reviews of
their existing recusal practices.43 Many are zeroing in on what Indiana
professor Charlie Geyh calls "the questionable practice" of relying "too
heavily on judges to evaluate their own disqualification." 44 The
Economist tartly captured the problem by noting that "Mr. Benjamin
found he was unbiased after deliberating with himself. 4 5 If, as seems
likely, Caperton spurs courts and judges to confront that practice, then
regardless of how often Caperton applies as dispositive precedent in
itself, the decision will not only be correct today, but compelling
tomorrow.

http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njonline/rg.20090615 _7680.php.
43. The Brennan Center will be continually tracking and updating state-level
at
reform
disqualification
on
developments
(click
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/statejudicial-reform-efforts_2009/
on 2009 Judicial Disqualification Initiatives in the States).
44. Carney, supra note 42.
45. United States: Not for Sale, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2009, at 36.

